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I. COURT LIMITS TORT REMEDIES IN CONTRACT
In Myrtle Beach Pipeline Corp. v. Emerson Electric Co.' the federal
district court limited further the availability of tort remedies in breach of
contract cases. The court barred a negligence claim arising from a component
part's failure that resulted in substantial damage to property not owned by the
plaintiff. Relying on the economic loss rule,2 the court held that where
"sophisticated parties to a commercial transaction have negotiated a contract,
...and the product injures only itself .... contract law, specifically the
Uniform Commercial Code, and not tort law, provides the exclusive rights and
remedies of the parties."' The court expanded the economic loss rule's effect
by defining restrictively the "other property" limit to the rule. The court held
that any property not owned by the plaintiff did not constitute other property.4
In dicta, the court provided an even more limiting defimition of other property,
theoretically consistent with the rationale supporting the economic loss
doctrine: "[T]he 'other property' exception is not met if: ... injury to this
'other property,' even if owned by a plaintiff, were, or should have been,
contemplated by the contract." 5 Myrtle Beach Pipeline expands the applica-
tion of the economic loss rule and limits the encroachment of tort remedies
onto contract law. South Carolina courts have not addressed the economic
loss rule's application in the commercial context.6 This article will focus on
1. 843 F. Supp. 1027 (D.S.C. 1993).
2. Economic losses include "damages for inadequate value, costs of repair, and replacement
of defective goods, or for consequent loss of profits [and] generally cannot be recovered in a tort
action. These losses represent the buyer's contractual expectation interest, and the buyer's
remedy, if any, must be based on the product's warranty." Mark A. Kaprelian, Note, Privity
Revisited: Tort Recovery by a Commercial Buyer for a Defective Product's Self-Inflicted
Damage, 84 MICH. L. Rnv. 517, 518 (1985) (footnotes omitted). A majority of the states and
the United States Supreme Court in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.,
476 U.S. 858 (1986), have endorsed the rule to bar tort claims in certain contexts. See Eric A.
Kekel, Comment, Oregon's Products Liability Law and the Problem Of Economic Loss, 28
WILAMETTE L. REV. 565, 571-78 (1992).
3. Myrtle Beach Pipeline, 843 F. Supp. at 1053.
4. Id. at 1055.
5. Id. at 1057.
6. The South Carolina Court of Appeals adopted the economic loss rule in Carolina Winds
Owners' Ass'n v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc., 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988),
overruled inpart by Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730
(1989). In Carolina Winds the court recognized that the rule would bar any recovery "[u]nless
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the court's definition of other property and not on the rule's general applicabil-
ity. 7
Plaintiff Myrtle Beach Pipeline Corporation (Myrtle Beach), a conglomer-
ation of corporations and their insurers, supplied and stored fuel for the United
States government at Myrtle Beach Air Force Base. Myrtle Beach contracted
with the government to install a fuel metering system, and hired Gonzalo
Anciro (Anciro) to design the system. Anciro recommended that a subsidiary
of defendant Emerson Electric Company (Emerson) supply the air eliminator
necessary for the metering system.8
In the parties' contract for the air eliminator, Emerson expressly
disclaimed all implied warranties, including the warranty of merchantability,
and limited any remedy to repair or replacement of the defective part.9
Emerson sold the part to Myrtle Beach for $1,145. The part failed, spilling
fuel onto the air base. Myrtle Beach eventually settled the dispute with the
government for $80,000 and, more substantially, agreed to bear the costs of
cleaning up the 123,000 gallons of spilled fuel. 'I Myrtle Beach
brought this action seeking to recover its costs of the settlement under theories
of strict liability, negligence, breach of implied warranty, and violation of the
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act.11 The first district judge12
granted the defendant's motions for partial summary judgment on the unfair
trade practices and the strict liability claims. In this opinion, the court granted
defendant Emerson summary judgment on the breach of implied warranty and
negligence claims.
13
meets a standard of quality, value, or fitness for an intended use...." Carolina Winds Owners'
Ass'n, 297 S.C. at 82, 374 S.E.2d at 902. The South Carolina Supreme Court later limited the
rule's applicationholding that the "'economic loss' rule will still apply where duties are created
solely by contract." Kennedy, 299 S.C. at 347, 384 S.E.2d at 737 (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted).
South Carolina courts never have addressed the economic loss rule's application in the
commercial context. See Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 302 S.C.
390, 393, 396 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1990). However, the Fourth Circuit has embraced the rule's
applicationin the commercial context. E.g., LaurensElec. Coop., Inc. v. Altec Indus., Inc., 889
F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1989); 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183 (4th Cir.
1986); Purvis v. Consol. Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1982).
7. The South Carolina courts have not addressed the "other property" issue as it relates to
ownership of the injured property.
8. Myrtle Beach Pipeline, 843 F. Supp. 1031-32.
9. Id. at 1031-32.
10. Id. at 1032.
11. Id. at 1032.
12. The case was transferred to Judge Traxler as part of the judge's beginning caseload. Id.
at 1032 n.1.
13. Myrtle Beach Pipeline, 843 F.Supp. at 1065-66.
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Having determined that South Carolina law applied,14 the court turned
to the contract claims. The court found that the implied warranties were
expressly disclaimed and that the express warranty limited plaintiff's recovery
to repair and replacement. Because of the parties' limited remedy provision,
the plaintiff could not recover the clean-up costs. 15
The court barred the negligence claims after a detailed analysis of the
economic loss rule's applicability in South Carolina. The court began with a
discussion of the rule's adoption by the Supreme Court in East River
Steamship Corp. v. Delaval Inc.,16 which held that a defendant had no duty
to prevent a product from injuring itself.17 Thus, when a product's failure
did not cause damage to a person or other property, the plaintiff could not
recover in tort. The Myrtle Beach Pipeline court discussed the Supreme
Court's justification of this ruling. Tort law concerns safety while contract
law addresses products' failures to perform.as warranted.' In the realm of
contract, the parties are free to allocate risk however the parties desire. The
tort concern for safety is diminished when the product has injured itself and
not other persons or property; parties' freedom to allocate risk is paramount.
Where the parties have allocated that risk, the court reasoned, tort law should
not reassign the risk.19
Having discussed the Supreme Court's interpretations of the rule, the
court then traced its adoption in South Carolina.' The court noted that
although the South Carolina courts have not addressed the rule in the
commercial context, case law recognizes the rule in the consumer arena.2
In Carolina Winds, the South Carolina Court of Appeals adopted the economic
loss rule.2 Later, in Kennedy, the supreme court expressed its reservations
to the economic loss rule's wide application but noted that where duties are
grounded solely in contract, the rule would bar tort claims if the product
injures only itselfL2
Because the South Carolina courts had not addressed the rule's application
in the commercial context, the court explored the rule's application by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,' concentrating on the cases Purvis, 2000
Watermark, and Laurens.
14. Id. at 1032-34.
15. Id. at 1035-48.
16. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
17. Id. at 871.
18. Myrtle Beach Pipeline, 843 F. Supp. at 1049.
19. Id. at 1048-49.
20. Id. at 1050-51.
21. Id. at 1050-51.
22. See supra note 6.
23. See supra note 6.
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The court began with a discussion of Purvis. In Purvis the Fourth Circuit
applied the economic loss rule to bar the tort claim because the plaintiff's loss
resulted from mere product ineffectiveness.' The Myrtle Beach Pipeline
court noted that the Purvis court based its application of the rule on the
parties' ability to defime contractually their own rights and remedies.
26
Interference by the courts would give one party a better bargain.27 The
Fourth Circuit noted further that a court had a duty to enforce bargains as
written because parties had already allocated risk to maximize their own gain
from the transaction. 28
In 2000 Watermark the Fourth Circuit addressed the rule's application
where property other than the product itself had been injured.29 The court
reaffirmed the rule's application as defined in Purvis, noting further that were
the rule not applied, the legislature's adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code warranty disclaimer provisions would be undermined.30  More
importantly, 2000 Watermark defined other property as property whose injury,
if the product failed, was not contemplated by the parties .3  The Fourth
Circuit's definition, rejecting a literal interpretation of other property, remains
consistent with Purvis' concern of noninterference with the parties' allocation
of risk.
Myrtle Beach Pipeline next addressed Laurens, which similarly recognized
the economic loss rule's application in a commercial context where the
product's failure injured only itself. 32 In that case the Fourth Circuit further
stressed the inappropriateness of a court reallocating risk for sophisticated
parties in a commercial transaction. 3 The Fourth Circuit noted that tort law
deals with the concern for the individual consumer, but such a concern has no
place in the commercial world where self-protection and allocation of risk
occur.
3 4
In light of these decisions, the Myrtle Beach Pipeline court found that "if
sophisticated parties to a commercial transaction have negotiated a contract,
... and the product injures only itself and not other property belonging to the
plaintiff, . . . contract law, specifically the Uniform Commercial Code, and
25. Purvis, 674 F.2d at 223.
26. Myrtle Beach Pipeline, 843 F. Supp. at 1051 (citing Purvis, 674 F.2d at 222).
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Purvis 674 F.2d at 222).
29. 2000 Watermark, 784 F.2d at 1183.
30. Id. at 1186.
31. See Myrtle Beach Pipeline, 843 F. Supp. at 1052 (citing 2000 Watermark, 784 F.2d at
1187-88).
32. Laurens, 889 F.2d at 1323.
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not tort law, provides the exclusive rights and remedies of the parties. "I
The court noted the parties' ability to protect their own interests and the
absence of personal injury. The court based its holding on the South Carolina
courts' adoption of the economic loss rule where rights were solely contractu-
al, a desire to avoid undermining the legislature's adoption of warranty
disclaimer provisions, and the parties' bargain. The court held that the loss
was economic and that Myrtle Beach's claim was barred because the other
property injured, the base, did not belong to Myrtle Beach.36 Thus Myrtle
Beach's remedy remained entirely contractual.
Having relied on Myrtle Beach's lack of ownership, the court proceeded
to discuss further the "other property" exception to the economic loss rule.37
The court held that the economic loss rule would bar recovery of injury to
property other than the product itself when the injury to the other property
was, or should have been, contemplated by the parties' contract.3" The court
further based its defimition of other property on the realities of commercial
transactions: The failure of the product to perform as expected is not beyond
the comprehension of the parties, and any loss that is a foreseeable result of
that product's failure should not be recoverable in tort.39 The parties'
contract allocates the risk of this loss.
The court then rejected a public policy exception to the economic loss
rule. 0 The court rejected also plaintiff's indemnification claims, holding that
a plaintiff could not recover through indemnification where no underlying tort
or contract claim existed.4"
The court correctly barred plaintiff's recovery because the cleanup costs
did not constitute other property. In holding that Myrtle Beach could not
recover for damage to property not owned by Myrtle Beach, the court relied
on a number of cases that did not specifically address the issue of recovery
where plaintiff did not own the other injured property.4
35. Myrtle Beach Pipeline, 843 F. Supp. at 1053.
36. Id. at 1056.
37. Id. at 1056-62.
38. Id. at 1057.
39. Id.
40. Myrtle Beach Pipeline, 843 F. Supp. at 1061-62. The plaintiff argued that, in light of the
huge environmental hazard caused by the air eliminator's failure, the economic loss rule should
not arbitrarily bar tort recovery. The court rejected this contention specifically, citing Public
Service Enterprise Group, Inc. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 722 F. Supp. 184 (D.N.J. 1989),
where the New Jersey District Court refused to recognize a public policy exception to the
economic loss rule when the economic damages were caused by nuclear material.
41. Myrtle Beach Pipeline, 843 F. Supp. at 1063-65.
42. The court relied on several cases that state that the plaintiff owned the other injured
property; however, the plaintiff's ownership of the other property was not at issue in those cases.
Laurens; Purvis; Neibarger v. Universal Coops, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 1992); and
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In Cooley v. Salopian Industries, Ltd.,4 the plaintiff purchased poultry
equipment from the defendant. When the equipment failed, the plaintiff sought
recovery in contract and in tort. The South Carolina District Court held that
any claims in strict liability were barred.' The court held that strict liability
"requires an allegation of damages 'for physical harm thereby caused [by the
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous] to the ultimate user
or consumer or to his property . . . . ' The court stressed that no other
property was injured, and thus, the economic loss rule barred recovery in
strict liability.
46
The Myrtle Beach Pipeline court relied also on Held v. Mitsubishi Aircraft
International, Inc.,' which addressed the "other property" issue. In Held,
the plaintiff purchased an airplane from defendant who disclaimed numerous
warranties and limited plaintiff's remedies in the event of the airplane's
failure. The plane was destroyed in a crash, and the plaintiff sought to
recover, among other things, the cost of settlement of a suit brought by a
passenger against the plaintiff.4"
The court held that the plaintiff could not recover the cost of the
settlement because the plaintiff's claim was barred by the economic loss
rule.49 The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments that other persons (the
passengers) were injured, which would negate the rule's bar of a claim under
a strict liability theory.50 In Held, the court relied on Cooley and the
language of Restatement § 402A to reach its holding.
Myrtle Beach argued that the court's "other property" definition did not
harmonize with City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co."1 In that case the
Fourth Circuit permitted the city to recover economic losses from an asbestos
manufacturer. The Myrtle Beach Pipeline court distinguished City of
Greenville on a number of grounds. 2
Massachusetts Eng'g Co., 801 F. Supp. 903 (D.N.H. 1992), which does not address the
ownership distinction.
43. 383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974).
44. Id. at 1119.
45. Cooley, 383 F. Supp. at 1119 (alterations in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965)). The Restatement and the comment have been enacted by South
Carolina's legislature. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 to -30 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
46. Id. at 1119.
47. 672 F. Supp. 369 (D. Minn. 1987).
48. Id. at 372-73.
49. Id. at 374.
50. Id. at 376-77. The court refused to carry the rationale to the negligence claim because
the Minnesota Supreme Court did not apply the economic loss rule in negligence cases. Id. at
377.
51. 827 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987).
52. First, the court noted that the plaintiffin City of Greenville owned the damaged property,
whereas Myrtle Beach did not own the air strips. Second, the defendant in City of Greenville
[Vol. 46
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Cooley and Held rely heavily on the Restatement, which has been
interpreted by the courts as barring recovery of economic loss in strict
liability. Courts rely on the Restatement language permitting recovery in strict
liability for damage to the plaintiff or to the plaintiff's property. 3 The courts
interpret this language as precluding recovery for damage to the product
itself.54 However, the comments to the Restatement, which have been
enacted by the South Carolina Legislature,55 do not necessarily dictate this
result:
The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of. . . the
Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is not affected by
limitations on the scope and content of warranties, or by limitation to
'buyer' and 'seller' in those statutes ... The consumer's cause of action
... is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement ... .56
Thus, the conclusion by the Myrtle Beach Pipeline and other courts that
the Restatement dictates the economic loss rule's bar does not necessarily
follow from the section.
Although the court's holding may not square with the comments to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, it does conform to prior courts'
interpretations of the section. Further, the court's more restrictive dicta
definition of other property is theoretically sound. Myrtle Beach Pipeline
adopted the economic loss rule in the commercial context to protect commer-
knowingly sold a dangerous product. Third, asbestos is an inherently dangerous product, but an
air eliminator is not. Fourth, in City of Greenville grave personal injury was involved, and in
the present case only property damage occurred. Fifth, the court in City of Greenville concluded
that the parties would not have shifted the loss onto the plaintiff, as application of the economic
loss rule would have done. Finally, City of Greenville was decided on its particular facts. Myrtle
Beach Pipeline, 843 F.Supp. at 1056.
Without discussing the sufficiency of the court's distinctions, it should be noted that courts
often apply the economic loss rule differently in asbestos litigation. East Mississippi Electric
PowerAss'n v. Porcelain Products Co., 729 F. Supp. 512 (D.D. Miss. 1990), noted the tendency
of courts to apply the economic loss rule sparingly in asbestos cases. The court then held the
economic loss rule barred plaintiff's tort claims. Other cases have permitted plaintiffs to assert
tort claims. E.g., Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15 v. United States Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915
(8th Cir. 1993); Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 13 v. United States Gypsum Co., 690 F. Supp. 866
(D.N.D. 1988); Town of Hooksett Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & co., 617 F. Supp. 126 (D.N.H.
1984).
53. The Restatement provides: "One who sells any product in a defective condition ... is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property.. . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
54. E.g. Held, 672 F.Supp. at 377.
55. SC. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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cial parties' allocation of risk and to recognize the commercial sophistication
of the parties.
Other courts also have emphasized a need to respect the legislature's
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and its limited warranty provisions.
For example, Neibarger v. Universal Coops.7 discussed these benefits of the
economic loss rule. In Neibarger, the plaintiff sued in tort to recover for
damages to his cows resulting from a defect in a milking system designed and
sold by the defendants. The court denied tort recovery because "[a] contrary
holding would not only serve to blur the distinction between tort and contract,
but would undermine the purpose of the Legislature in adopting the [Uniform
Commercial Code]."58 The court further recognized that the "adoption of the
economic loss doctrine will allow sellers to predict with greater certainty their
potential liability for product failure and to incorporate those predictions into
the price or terms of the sale. ""
Ringer v. Agway, Inc.60 addressed similar issues. Ringer denied
recovery to a plaintiff whose farmland, crop, and farm machinery were injured
by defective seeds purchased from defendant. The court denied recovery
because plaintiff suffered only "disappointed commercial expectations."
61
The court emphasized that permitting a plaintiff to recover would "disrupt the
expectations of the parties by supplanting their agreement by allowance of tort
recovery, which raises the possibility of potentially unlimited liability. "62
The federal court's decision in Myrtle Beach Pipeline recognizes the South
Carolina courts' limited adoption of the economic loss rule63 and anticipates
the South Carolina court's expansion of that rule in a way that respects the
South Carolina Legislature's enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code.
In Myrtle Beach Pipeline, the court restrictively defined other property,
damage to which bars application of the economic loss rule and permits
recovery in tort. The court correctly respected the parties' rights to contract
57. 486 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 1992).
58. Neibarger, 486 N.W.2d at 618.
59. Id. at 619.
60. 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 114 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
61. Id. at 121.
62. Id. (quoting Public Serv. Ent. Group., Inc. 722 F. Supp. at 196).
63. In Carolina Winds Owners' Ass'n, the South Carolina Court of Appeals adopted the
economic loss rule, noting that the rule "simply observes the traditional distinction between
recovery in contract and recovery in negligence in those cases where the damage consists of a
diminution in the expected value of a product." Carolina Winds Owners'Ass'n, 297 S.C. at 82,
374 S.E.2d at 902. The court also observed that "the risk to the expectancy interest can be fairly
allocated by agreement of the parties to the sale. To protect himself, the purchaser may either
take warranties, bargain for a lower price, or insure the risk." Id. Later, in Kennedy, the court
restricted the rule's use to situations "where duties are created solely by contract." Kennedy, 299
S.C. at 347, 384 S.E.2d at 737. That case, however, involved the negligence of a builder where
other legal duties, besides contractual, may have been breached.
[Vol. 46
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freely and the legislature's actions to facilitate free agreement through the
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. Both concerns previously
encouraged the South Carolina courts to adopt the economic loss rule in
Carolina Winds Owners' Ass'n. 4
Rachel Scott Decker
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